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China's acquisitions abroadglobal ambitions, domestic effects
By Nicholas C. Howson
The following essay is based on a talk delil'ered to the Law School's International Law Workshop
on October 17, 2005.

I

n the past year or so, the world has observed with seeming

trepidation what appears to be a new phenomenon- China's
"stepping out" into the world economy. This moYe, labeled the
"Going Out Strategy" by Chinese policy makers, sees China
acting in the world not just as a trader of commodities and raw
materials, or the provider of inexpensively -produced consumer
goods for every corner of the globe, but as a driven and sophisticated acquirer of foreign assets and the equity interests in the
legal entities that control such assets. The New Yorker magazine,
eYer topical and appropriately humorous, highlighted this
attention with a cartoon in its October 17, 2005 edition. That
drawing shows two prosperous and no doubt Upper East Side dwelling matrons holding cocktails before a fireplace. AboYe
the fireplace hangs the formal portrait of a balding, well -fed,
elderly, man. Looking at the portrait, one lady says matterof-factly to the other: "That's Karl, before he was purchased by the
Chinese."

The CNOOC bid for Unocal
This concern, and the slightly nerrnus humor it engendered,
was inflamed by a Chinese oil company's summer bid for the
control of an iconic American oil company, in direct competition with a U.S. oil company suitor. That transaction was of
course the Hong Kong-domiciled and listed China National
Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd.'s (CNOOC Ltd.) June 2005
all cash US$ 18. 5 billion bid for Unocal of California- at a more
than 10 percent premium to Chevron's competing stock and
cash deal, already the subject of a binding merger agreement.
The anxiety- at least as articulated in the press, the U.S.
Congress, and at anxious hearings in Washington- focused on
an eclectic but eye-catching range of issues. Some thundered
grave warnings about the threat to America's "national security"
generally, and U.S. "energy security" specifically (meaning
U.S. access to worldwide hydrocarbon production and control
of downstream refining, supply, and distribution); others
worried vaguely about the transaction as a harbinger of China's
increasing economic, political, and military influence; still

others pointed to the phenomenon of a long-feared "China Inc."
using Communist-led go,·ernment funds to finance an all cash
deal to better the American champion's cash and stock offer.
This latter characterization was fueled by the prospect of huge
borro,, ings perhaps a third of the cash offer- from a consor tium of banks led by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC), a People's Republic of China (PRC) state owned
commercial bank, and from the CNOOC Ltd.'s 70 percent
shareholder, state-owned, and PRC-domiciled China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Still others, perhaps
trade lawyers sensing a rhetorical or business opportunity,
went so far as to cry foul under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) accession deal which China completed in November
200 I- labeling the proposed financing of the Unocal bid as a
breach ofWTO prohibitions against state subsidies, and thus
actionable under the WTO (and the separate China-specific)
countervailing duties regime.
In a different em·ironment, each of these points could have
been rebutted fairlv easilv. The worn· about the "takeover" of
a U.S. oil company might have been answered by pointing out
that more than 70 percent of Unocal's petroleum production,
and more than 75 percent of its petroleum reserves, remain
outside ef the United States (ironically, mostly in Asia), and all of
the Unocal production is promised to various foreign buyers
(again, primarily Asian buyers) under long-term production sharing or production sales contracts. (In fact, Unocal's
worldwide oil and natural gas production represented only a
measly one percent of entire U.S. consumption.) For downstream
assets (refining, pipelines, distribution, and retail)- where
control issues become marginally more relevant- Unocal has
no downstream assets whatsoever in the United States (having
sold them almost a decade ago). The attack which portrayed
CNOOC's soft or government-provided financing as an illegal
subsidvJ was a stretch from anv honest international trade
lawyer's standpoint, as nothing about the proposed CNOOC
acquisition, and its financing, violated WTO rules on trade (not
J
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investment)-related subsidies, or the PRC's specific commitments upon its accession to the WTO, or under trade-related
investment measures (TRIMS) norms. The focus on Chinese
providers of finance, whether state run banks, or the 70 percent
state-owned shareholder of the bidder, somehow uniformly
failed to identify the critical bridge financing provided by such
all-American financial institutions as Goldman Sachs and JP
Morgan, to be refinanced with CNOOC with debt issuances
(and significant underwriting fees for the same financiers) soon
after completion of the deal. Clearly something else, something
rather pernicious, was at work given the hostile reception that
greeted CNOOC's effort to act on the world stage.

The new/old rallying cry"China isn't playing by the rules!"
The CNOOC bid for Unocal also gave renewed voice to
what already seems a tired refrain: "China doesn't play by the
rules." Peter Robinson, the vice chairman of Chevron who
led the public relations effort for the CNOOC competitor,
remained "on [this) message." Whereas formerly the refrain
had been heard on international trade matters and intellectual property rights protection and enforcement, it was now
suddenly part of a heated chorus framing the far more sensitive
sphere of cross-border acquisitions of controlling interests in
U.S. -domiciled mega-corporations.
The truth is that the CNOOC bid signaled something rather
different, and given China's reforms over the past two decades,
something more profound . Not only did the CNOOC effort
represent another significant step in China's complex and
broad-ranging interaction with the world generally, but far
more critically, it signaled a striking new phase of the PR C's
behavior-changing entanglement with foreign and international
legal, commercial, and governance norms, all with direct reform
effects inside China. Thus, the CNOOC bid implicated precisely
the opposite of a critique which accuses the PRC of"not playing
by the rules." With the Unocal bid, China, its government, and
various Chinese commercial instruments were forced for the
first time to take cognizance of, and play by, internationallyaccepted rules- not merely in their business operations and
external contracting, public disclosure, accounting practices, or
the conventions of international M&A, but even with respect to
internal corporate governance at the firms themselves. In this
way, we might see China's new acquisition activity outside of its
borders rather more grandly as an important mechanism for

the encounter with, and absorption of, bedrock "rule of law"
concepts and practices.

American perceptions of China and the Chinese,
Chinese perceptions of foreign capital in China
In the 1950s, American journalist and historian Harold Isaacs
published an important book on American perceptions of China
and India titled Scratches On Our Minds. The book synthesized
the results of numerous surveys of Americans with respect to
common ideas of those two great civilizations. Importantly, the
surveys were directed to an "elite" population in Americadiplomats, academics, well-traveled writers and intellectuals,
and multinational business leaders. Isaacs' idea was that the
perceptions of this group were in some ways more important
than those of the American "everyman." First, the elite group
had in many ways encountered the reality of China and India,
and might be thought to have realistic, nuanced impressions
arising from such experience. Second, such persons would
- by virtue of their leadership positions- have an ongoing
involvement in dealings with those societies and making or
implementing U.S. policy towards China and India. Isaacs'
sad conclusion was that even these notionally well -educated,
informed, and experienced policy makers and leaders operated
with heads literally stuffed with damaging and simplistic cliches
about China and India . In the Chinese case, these deep-seated
attitudes swung between wildly divergent images of the "good"
and "bad" Chinese, with no nuanced middle ground. On the
good side: Pearl Buck's on-the-cusp Christians, or cheerful,
diligent, poor, innocent, peasants, and Charlie Chan- benign,
humble, problem-solving, intelligent, and deferential; on the
bad side, the diabolical, mysterious, shadowy, cannibalistic,
sinister, Dr. Fu Manchu, or, collectively, the rampaging hordes
constituting a "Yellow Peril" threatening to swamp and overrun American "civilization," or at least the American order.
While the dichotomy that Isaacs identified may seem absurd or
anachronistically racist in what we assure ourselves is a more
enlightened age, it does seem to track nicely the dizzying swings
in U.S . perceptions over the three decades between President
Nixon's visits to Beijing and Shanghai in 1972, and current ideas
about China as a distinct military, economic (commercial),
and ideological "threat" or "strategic competitor." It does not
seem an exaggeration to identify these deeply-ingrained and
easily processed ideas as one set of views informing American
approaches to China's accelerating investigation of overseas
acquisitions.

Turning the mirror, we might also point out that Chinese
elites have long had equally negative perceptions of foreign
(and particularly Western) involvement in China- politically,
militarily, and of course commercially. This is a very long story,
not easily elaborated in this kind of presentation. Suffice to
say that this shared attitude was (and is) determined equally
by xenophobia and the bitter experience ofWestern incursions into Qing Dynasty China from the early 19th century,
and through the Opium Wars and the "unequal treaties" which
pried treaty ports and sovereignty over Hong Kong Island from
China, which in turn served in large measure to de-legitimize
and topple the last Imperial dynasty. Even people in China who
regret the ~buses and chaos of the Maoist era approve of how
the Communist victory in 1948 -49 forced out of China the
"imperialist-colonialist" powers, the United States included. So
it is not surprising then that on the eve of China's 1979 historychanging "Reform and Opening to the Outside World" strategy,
China's premier foreign language propaganda organ would
proclaim: "We do not allowforeign capital to exploit China's resources
nor do we run joint enterprises with foreign enterprises, still less beg
them for foreign loans" (from a 1977 Beijing Review). And yet,

even before this statement was contradicted by thousands of
Sino -foreign joint ventures, and China's rise to the status as the
World Bank's largest borrower, there was an exception. Chinese
policy makers had in fact started very early in the 1970s to set
the groundwork for cooperation with foreign oil companies.
This cooperation, focusing on hard-to -exploit "offshore" oil and
gas fields (i.e., within China's sovereign seas, but not onshore or
dry land), started in the late 1970s, yet only after very significant Chinese internal disputes about a potential loss of sovereignty, China's control of a strategic energy assets, and hidden
foreign agendas seeking economic and political (and military)
control. In fact, Chinese Communist Party elites in 1977 were
saying exactly the same things about foreign participation in
Chinese oil and gas production sharing arrangements as Senator
Chuck Schumer, Chevron, and a large part of the U.S. House of
Representatives were saying about a Chinese company's bid for
control of Unocal almost three decades later. That is one irony
revealed in this particular corner of history; the other is that the
commercial entity the Chinese government set up to bargain
with and enter into production sharing contracts with the likes
of Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, and others for the exploration,
development, and production of these Chinese offshore oil and
gas resources was none other than the China National Offshore
Oil Corporation, then as now known by its acronym, CNOOC.

Acquisitive Chinanot falling "dominoes" but "falling icons"
Some of the uglier visions conjured by the Isaacs survey
in the 1950s seem to have been reanimated in 2004-05 by
the spectacle of China's global ambitions. For Americans of a
certain age, the present climate recalls U.S. attitudes towards
Japanese ambitions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which
were hostile even though Japan was a political and military ally
for the United States. The signal transaction in those days was
the acquisition by Japanese interests of an American iconRockefeller Center in New York City (perhaps closely followed
by the Japanese takeo\'er of the most American of businesses
- Hollywood's Columbia Pictures.) Today, Chinese companies
also seem to be chasing America's icons, with the ready help of
America's own financial institutions acting as lenders, bridge
lenders, or private equity co-investors. At the same time, many
American companies, iconic or not, are actively seeking to be
bailed out by Chinese capital- another interesting and ironic
reversal on China's own use of foreign multinationals to finance
or save bankrupt state-owned enterprises in China in the very
earliest days of the Chinese reform. And what icons they are:
CNOOC's bid for Unocal, one of the original Standard Oil
petroleum companies (the Rockefellers again); Shandong
Hai' er's US$ 2. 5 billion bid for Maytag (the defenseless Maytag
repairman); Beijing Lenovo's US$ l. 75 billion acquisition of
IBM's personal computer business (for Wolverine fans, a lesser
"Blue"). And the falling "icons" are not only American. In recent
years, the world has witnessed other developed economy
properties coming under PRC control: TCL's acquisition of
Thomson France's TV business (RCA); Shanghai Automotive's
purchase of Korea's number four auto-maker (Ssangyong
Motors); the Minmetals bid to take over Canada's Noranda
(also owner of Falconbridge); Nanjing Auto's takeover of the
MG Rover assets in the United Kingdom; Huawei Technology
of Shenzhen's stalking of Marconi. ... The list seems to goes on
and on, and worryingly for some outside China, seems to get
longer.

How we got here from there
These acquisitions of iconic foreign industrial properties are
in fact the culmination of a 25 -year process of investment and
financing-related interaction between China and the outside
world. China's "Reform and Opening to the Outside World"
policy of the late 1970s featured, among other things, domestic
economic reform (and the slow march to a semi-marketized
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economy), construction of a legal system (promulgation of
substanti,·e law and recovery of legal institutions), increased
trade with foreign nations, and the attraction of foreign direct
investment (FOi) into the PRC.
At least from the Chinese side, FOi was understood from
its earliest days as a way to attract hard currency financing
for China's bankrupt state-owned or controlled assets, and
gain additional benefits like foreign technology, management
know -how, distribution and marketing skills, and foreign sales
channels for hard currency-earning exports. Foreign capital
seemed happy to do its part, by donating capital, technology,
and management expertise into China, all for a chance
howe\'er tightly restricted- at the rumored nirrnna of one
billion Chinese consumers. Regardless of the moti,·ations
on either side of the equation, the FOi program did sen-e as
the exclusive vehicle for early introduction of great areas of
commercial, corporate, and financial law into China, including
items as basic as corporate legal personality, transferable
equity interests, separation of owners and management (and in
management, between a board and an executive corps), and a
market for equity interests in enterprises.
In the early 1990s, China began to look to another
mechanism to raise finance for the same moribund state assets
- the domestic and then international capital markets. These
ambitions spurred "corporatization" of asset groupings in China,
and the issuance of stock by such new corporations to both
domestic and foreign investors buying on China's new stock
exchanges, and very quickly, foreign investors buying on foreign
exchanges- in Hong Kong, then New York, then London, then
Tokyo, and so on. Overall, this second interaction with the
international capital markets- again, featuring Chinese issuers
raising funds from foreign capital providers- proved beneficial
for Chinese commercial legal developments, by introducing
foreign securities laws and exchange regulation, a new world
of disclosure and legal enforcement (both administrative and
through private rights of action), international accounting
standards, and internal governance requirements.
And yet, even as China saw the establishment of ever greater
numbers of in-country FOi projects, or listings of China- or
Hong Kong-domiciled issuers on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) via Securities and Exchange Commission-registered
offerings, the Chinese government proved positively shy in
calling Chinese enterprises to fulfill their destiny outside of the
embrace of the PRC- allowing only tentative forays first into
Hong Kong, and then in Southeast Asia. While large Chinese

companies established offices and sometimes subsidiaries
throughout the West beginning in the mid 1990s, these were
almost uniformly shell companies used to facilitate simple
trading activities with foreign purchasers or vendors. That
situation changed radically in the late 1990s, when individual
Chinese enterprises- some old-style state-owned or controlled
actors, others fiercely independent Chinese companies- began
to look actively for im-estment deals abroad, a set of ambitions
only subsequently sanctioned and supported by central policy
makers under the so -called "Going Out" strategy. It is again
beyond the scope of this presentation to speculate in detail
on what is behind the now acknowledged fact of the "Going
Out" strategy, or what high policy aims call for its rhetorical
support by the central gm·ernment. Here, one might point to
the need of these companies to procure stable access to certain
kinds of resources, and/ or technology. Other, more manufacturing oriented companies are clearly after foreign distribution channels and thus access to foreign markets, better profit
margins in better-developed product markets, and use of established "global" brand names . And certainly many bold and rather
far -seeing Chinese managers believe they need to "Go Out"
to test and strengthen their companies in a truly competitive,
and global market, far removed from the cozy monopoly-based
market that remains a substantial part of China's industrial
economv.
For present purposes, it is most important to recognize that
the "Going Out" strategy is in most cases being led by Chinese
enterprises themselves, rather than the central gm·ernment .
(For instance, in late 2005, it was revealed that the CNOOC
bid for Unocal was undertaken almost entirely at the initiatiYe of CNOOC, and over the fierce objections and stubborn
hesitations of PRC central government actors. This may have
lulled CNOOC executives [and their ad\'isors] into a false sense
of achievement. Perhaps they thought if they had managed
to com'ince their political masters to allow them to proceed
with the bid, it would be so much easier to convince Unocal
shareholders to accept the higher price offered.) In addition,
the Chinese government has in the last two years also created
or ameliorated the legal basis for such outbound investment
activity, and thus conformed the law (or removed legal restrictions) which had previously worked to restrain such activity.
(Here, most of the restrictions were sourced in foreign
exchange regulation and government permissions for offshore
holdings.) Most important, this outbound push has caused the
J

ln"tial contest
UNOCAL and its suitors (to April 4, 2005)
2004
• End of 2004-Unocal is "shopped"-discussions with both

• March 29-30---two-day meeting of CNOOC Ltd. board;

Chevron and CNOOC;
• December 26-Unocal and CNOOC Chairman meet to
discuss a possible deal (CNOOC Ltd. board not advised of
the meeting);

• March 30---Unocal board, upon receiving Chevron's revised

2005
• January 6-Financial Times reports that CNOOC is considering making a bid for Unocal; Los An9eles Times reports a
CNOOC bid of US$ l 3 billion;

• January 6-Chevron delivers a letter to Unocal, indicating
strong interest in purchasing Unocal;

• January-early February- CNOOC lobbies PRC government departments in preparation for a possible bid for
Unocal;

• February 26-Chevron's initial bid: all share deal, 0.94
Chevron shares for each share of Unocal;

• February 26-Unocal board determines that Chevron's
offer is insufficient;

• March I- Unocal notifies Chevron that the February 26
Chevron bid is refused;

• March I- Unocal in contact with CNOOC and ENI (Italy)
as alternative bidders, and gives each until March 7 to offer a
price;

• March 7- CNOOC Ltd. communicates preliminary bid
range of US$59.00-62.00 per Unocal share (US$16.0-16.8
billion)- immediately rejected by Unocal;

• March 29- Chevron raises its February 26 bid 10 percent

foreign, non-executive, directors are informed of a potential
bid for the first time, and vote to block CNOOC Ltd. bid;
CNOOC signals to Unocal that a bid will not be forthcoming
on March 30;
offer of March 29, decides to terminate negotiations with
ENI, and gives CNOOC until April 2 to make an offer;

• March JI - CNOOC Ltd. board meets, but is still unable to
agree on the making of an offer, or a price; one foreign, nonexecutive, director resigns for "health reasons";

• April I- CNOOC board in disarray, not even able to
convene a board meeting;

• April I- the day before an anticipated bid from CNOOC
Ltd., Chevron agrees to sweeten its bid again, by giving
Unocal shareholders a choice of an all share deal, cash and
share deal, or all cash deal: (i) 0. 7725 Chevron shares plus
US $ l 6.25 for each Unocal share; (ii) 1.03 Chevron shares for
each Unocal share; or (iii) US$65.00 per Unocal share;

• April 2- Unocal board meets, decides to make a final
decision on April 3;

• April 3- CNOOC Ltd. board meets again, but is still unable
to make an offer;

• April 4---Unocal and Chevron sign a definitive merger
agreement for combined cash/stock deal with Unocal, at
value of US$60.65 per share (US$ l 6.5 billion) (this includes
"force-the-vote" clause [Chevron as acquirer can force Unocal
board to put the Chevron bid to a Unocal shareholder vote]
and US$500 million "break up" fee).

- still an all share deal, 1.03 Chevron shares for each share of
Unocal;

full range of Chinese actors- from goYcrnmcnt departments to
enterprises to individual managers and inYestors- to encounter
a whole menu of laws, regulations, institutions, customs,
and more, that govern and shape inYcstmcnt and commercial
actiYity in political economics outside of China.

The CNOOC bid for Unocal-the facts
We now turn briefly to the very specific situation which
caused so much worry in the United States, the CNOOC Ltd.

bid for Unocal during the summer of 2005. As it developed,
the proposed transaction inrnlvcd CNOOC Ltd. - thc Hong
Kong -domiciled, 70 percent-controlled , subsidiary of Beijing's
purely state-owned enterprise, China National Offshore Oil
Corporation or "CNOOC" making an all cash bid for Unocal,
that bid supported by proposed financing of more than USS7
billion from CNOOC (to be swapped for shares in CNOOC
Ltd. within two years) and US S6 billion from a syndicate led by

Rev·sed contest
CNOOC re-enters the fray

the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), but with
JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs participating with bridge
financing (to be taken out with the issuance of debt by CNOOC
Ltd. after completion of the acquisition of Unocal).
The major points timeline for the rise and fall of CNOOC's
efforts may be recited as follows: At the end of 2004, Unocal
was being "shopped" in America and internationally. In
December of 2004, CNOOC was approached by Unocal, with
Unocal executives asking CNOOC if the Chinese company
would be interested in acquiring the American company. At
the beginning of 2005, the Financial Times reported (falsely as
it turned out) an imminent bid for Unocal from CNOOC.
This, perhaps by design, conjured an immediate indication
of"strong interest" from Chevron on January 6, and then a
formal all stock bid from Chevron on February 26, valuing
Unocal at over USS 16 billion. All through this period, and
then March, CNOOC was not able to make a bid the bid
requested ef it by Unocal- because independent directors on
the board of CNOOC Ltd. could not be persuaded to vote in
favor of such an action. (Their formally articulated concerns
focused on the crushing debt load CNOOC Ltd. would have
to take on to complete the purchase, and the hugely dilutive
effects for non-CNOOC shareholders of future, necessary,
issuances of stock by CNOOC Hong Kong. These outside
directors may in truth have been alienated by the way in which
the proposal was brought to them by CNOOC executives and
CNOOC Ltd. executive board members at the last minute,
and seeking a "rubber stamp.") Insiders also report real battles
between CNOOC executives and the highest-level Chinese
central government actors, many fiercely opposed to the
proposed takeover bid by a Chinese company for an American
oil company. Unocal finally gave CNOOC Ltd. until April 2
to post a bid, which caused Chevron to raise its own offer on
April 1. CNOOC Ltd. remained stymied at the board level,
and thus with no Chinese bid forthcoming over the night of
April 2-3, Unocal signed a binding merger agreement with
Chevron on April 3, 2005, valuing Unocal at approximately
USS 16. 5 billion. In an example of skilled lawyering, the
Chevron lawyers included in the merger agreement a "force the
vote" clause, which contractually obligated Unocal, at Chevron's
direction, to convene a shareholders' meeting to approve the sale
to Chevron. (This made the Chevron strategy going forward
rather simple if and when a competing Chinese bid was
forthcoming, Chevron needed only to introduce doubt into
the minds of Unocal shareholders about eventual U.S. govern-
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(June 1 to August 10, 2005)
• June 1

Fu Chengyu, Chairman of CNOOC and
CNOOC Ltd., works to convince CNOOC Ltd. board that
CNOOC Ltd. should make offer for Unocal;

• June 10--U.S. Federal Trade Commission raises no
objection to Chevron-Unocal merger;

•

•

Early June- Continued resistance on CNOOC Ltd.
board from foreign-citizen independent directors- they
articulate concern about the crushing debt load CNOOC
Ltd. would have, and the dilutive impact on minority shareholders, etc.;
June 22- CNOOC Ltd. board votes unanimously to
make bid (Goldman Sachs-employed independent director
abstaining to avoid "conflict of interest');

• June 22-3

CNOOC Ltd. makes bid for UnocalUS$67.00 per share or US$ l 8.5 billion, all cash (11
percent higher than Chevron's signed US$ l 6.5 billion
offer);

• June 22-midJuly- CNOOC Ltd. and Unocal negotiate
draft Merger Agreement in New York;

• June 24--41 members of U.S. Congress send letter to
President Bush urging a "thorough review" of the CNOOC
Ltd. offer;

• June 30--U.S. House of Representatives votes 33392 to bar the U.S. Treasury from using any of its funds
to "recommend approval" of the CNOOC Ltd. bid per
the CFIUS process; and 398-15 non-binding resolution, expressing concern that the CNOOC Ltd. bid, if
completed, could "threaten to impair national security"
(CFIUS standard);

• June 30--U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
approves proxy and tender offer materials for ChevronUnocal deal;

• July 1- CNOOC Ltd. makes pre-emptive request of
CFIUS to commence investigation of announced CNOOC
Ltd. bid and proposed transaction;

ment approval, force a shareholders' meeting, and allow the
Unocal shareholders to approve the bird in hand (Chevron's
lower-priced deal) over a possibly unstable but richer option
[CNOOC's higher bid).) Soon thereafter, the shareholders'
meeting required under the governing merger agreement was
set for later in the same summer- August 10, 2005.
More than two months later, CNOOC management finally
cajoled the dissenting CNOOC Ltd. board members into place,

7- NSC Director Steven Hadley indicates that CFIUS
• July
review will only occur once the deal is "finalized in some
way" (contradicting U.S. Department ofTreasury, which had
indicated review could start before);

• Mid-July

PLA General Zhu Chenghu quoted as saying
that the PRC might use nuclear weapons against the United
States if the United States intervenes over Taiwan;

13- CNOOC Ltd. board authorizes CNOOC Ltd .
• July
Chairman Fu Chengyu to increase all cash offer, from
US$67.00 to US$69.00 per share, but not exceeding
US$70.00 per share;
13- U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services
• July
Committee holds hearings at which the CNOOC bid is
uniformly denounced;

•
•
• July

July 14--CNOOC does not raise its bid;
July 14--Unocal board meets to consider competing
Chevron and CNOOC Ltd. offers;

15- Unocal board continues to meet- it does not
recommend CNOOC Ltd.'s higher all cash offer over existing
Chevron cash/ stock offer, but resolves to continue looking at
a CNOOC Ltd. offer, certain conditions being met (promise
of Unocal divestitures in the United States to get government
approval, and some kind of escrow fund to assure CNOOC
performance and funding of Unocal-Chevron "break up" fee);

• July
• July

15- CEO of Unocal calls Chairman of CNOOC Ltd.,
asks for CNOOC Ltd.'s "best offer";
16--Chairman of CNOOC Ltd. responds: CNOOC
Ltd. agrees to raise its offer to US$69 .00 per share, but only
if Unocal pays the Unocal-Chevron "break up" fee (US$5
million) and works with CNOOC to convince the U.S.
government to approve the deal;

19- Chevron formally increases its offer to US$63.00
• July
per share;
• July 19-20----CNOOC Ltd. does not raise its bid;

and on June 22 CNOOC Ltd . announced a much higher bid for
Unocal (US$ I 8 .5 billion), and an all cash one at that. Chevron
immediately went into action, conjuring the anxiety, fear, and
concerns alluded to at the start of this presentation. At this
point, CNOOC's only hope was that the political uncertainty
immediately rumored for the Chinese bid could be made a nonissue by early, hypothetical, approval of the Chinese acquisition
by the Commission on Foreign Investment in the United States

20----U.S. Congress passes Schumer amendment to the
• July
foreign operations spending bill; amendment holds that the
President may not approve proposed acquisitions by foreign
government-controlled entities in the United States until the
U.S. State Department reports to Congress on whether or
not the foreign government permits U.S. firms to "purchase,
acquire, merge or otherwise establish a joint relationship" with
a company based in the country, such report to be delivered
30 days prior to the proposed acquisition;

• July

25- U.S. Congress adds amendment to the proposed
energy bill, authorizing the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland
Security to undertake a four-month investigation of the effects
of China's worldwide energy demand, and providing for a
three-week period after delivery of this report before which
CFIUS would be permitted to submit a recommendation to
the President (lengthening the CFIUS review period from a
maximum of90 days to 141 days);

July - rumors on Capitol Hill that the Department of
• Late
Defense, not the Department of Commerce, will undertake
CFIUS investigations;

Late July U.S. Senate asks Secretary of Commerce to
• investigate
whether or not CNOOC Ltd. proposed financing
violates WTO rules on subsidies;

August2- CNOOC Ltd. formally withdraws its tender
• offer
for the stock of Unocal (only eight days from the Unocal
vote on the Chevron transaction) . In its withdrawal statement,
CNOOC Ltd. said that it would have considered raising its bid
for Unocal prior to the Unocal board vote, but for the fact of
the "impact of the U.S. political environment" (mei9uo zhen9zhi
huanjin9 de yinxian9);

•
• August

August 2- six percent rise in CNOOC Ltd.'s share price on
the NYSE;

10----Unocal shareholders vote, accepting Chevron's
amended offer.

(CFIUS), the U.S. government interagency group tasked with
analyzing foreign bids for American assets or equity interests
under Exon-Florio. (If Unocal shareholders were permitted
to believe that the acquisition would be approved by the U.S.
government, they would likely have rejected the lower Chevron
bid to take more value [and all in cash] under the CNOOC
offer.) Those hopes were dashed when, on July 7, the Bush
administration's National Security Advisor let it be known
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publicly that CFIUS would not make a pre-transaction review
of the bid or CNOOC's pre-filed Exon-Florio submission.
Unocal directors were still required to fulfill their fiduciary
duty to Unocal shareholders however, and so on July IS refused
to recommend either the agreed Chenon deal or the higher
CNOOC bid, but asked CNOOC for its final "best offer." That
was forthcoming a day later, when CNOOC raised its bid to
US$69 .00 per share. Three days later, Chevron raised its own
agreed offer- albeit to a level still lower than the Chinese bid,
or US$63 .00 per share . In these couple of weeks, the anti China and "China threat" rhetoric in the American Congress
grew almost unbearably over-heated, with se,·eral legislators
introducing bills specifically targeting CNOOC's proposed
acquisition of a U.S. energy company. CNOOC decision
makers saw that no bid from a Chinese company, no matter
how stable, or how rich, would be allowed to pass over the
significant political hurdles now in place. Accordingly, CNOOC
formally withdrew its offer for Unocal on August 2, 2005. On
August 10, 200S, Unocal shareholders approved the merger of
Unocal with Chevron.

CNOOC specificallyposter child of enmeshment with "the rules"
In many ways, the critiques and fear -mongering targeted
on CNOOC proved almost cruelly ironic. For CNOOC is
not the mere agent of a newly rapacious Chinese superpower,
or the servant of its insatiable appetite for energy resources.
Instead, CNOOC represents one of the first and best examples
of a significantly independent modern Chinese enterprise,
exposed very early in China's "Opening to the Outside World"
to commercial and investment activity under law, and fully
implemented notions of transparency, disclosure, and internal
firm governance.
CNOOC's development path provides a perfect example of
why observers simply must differentiate between the origins
and control of the Chinese players now stepping onto the world
stage. For instance, Lenovo, which acquired IBM's PC business,
is uniformly referred to as a "PRC state-owned" or "government
controlled" entity in the press and business literature. This is a
reference to the fact that the Chinese Academy of Sciences- a
Chinese social academic unit under the State Council- was
one of the original promoters of Lenovo (then "Legend") when
it became the first successful low cost producer of computer
hardware in China. (The Chinese Academy of Sciences acted
in much the same way by providing seed funding and technical
expertise to the Stone Corporation, which has not achieved

• "One of the reasons your price of gasoline is going up
is ... economies like China and India are demanding
more oil in a limited supply in a market that's of
limited supply." (President George Busl;i)
• "They're not playing by commercial rules; it's not fair
trading.... Clearly this is not a commercial competition. We are competing with the Chinese government,
and I think that is wrong.... We [Chevron) will produce
more oil and gas, and put it into the world supply....
We'll put oil on the market in a commercial way and
it'll be sold to the highest bidder. [CNOOC will use the
oil it produces for domestic consumption, which will
yield] less oil on the world market, which means higher
prices for U.S. consumers and all consumers." (Peter
Robinson, Vice Chair of Chevron)
• "My biggest concern is the preservation of Unocal's
energy assets in friendly hands. If a company is owned
by a foreign government, its loyalty is going to be to
that government." (Rep. Richard Pombo, Republican,
California)
• "Should we work with China?Yes. Should we turn
over our government, our business to China? No,
we shouldn't." (Rep. Carolyn Kilpatrick, Democrat,
Michigan)
• "Do we want a foreign power, whose military intentions in the long term are not clear, to own energy
assets inside our border?" (Larry Wortzel, U.S. China
Economic and Security Review Commission)
• "I'm a free trader, but being a free trader isn't synonymous with being a chump. He [U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury John W. Snow, making no comment on the
CNOOC bid] should have said, 'You bet we're going to
look at it.'" (Sen. Ron Wyden, Democrat, Oregon)
• "Remember, to the Chinese everything is related: the
economics, the diplomacy, the military posture. It's all
one." (Senior Administration Official, The New York Times)

the success of Lenovo.) How different Lenovo- even with the
participation of a government-run academic think tank- is
from Air France or PetroCanada or any entity that is traditionally conceived of as "state owned.'' Similarly, Hai' er, which made
a run at Maytag in partnership with U.S. private equity funds,
is government financed and promoted, but the "government"
in this case is a provincial level government in China which has

• "[CNOOC is) an organ, effectively, of the world's
largest communist dictatorship. [This transaction] should
be beyond the pale, given the nature of the Chinese
government ." Uames Woolsey, former director, CIA)
• "Does anybody honestly believe that the Chinese would
let an American company take over a Chinese company?"
(Sen. Charles Schumer, Democrat, New York)
• "[China] already has too many Treasury [bonds) . So
they're looking to buy assets. Chinese companies are
growing, they are ambitious, they want to be global
players, they want to have global brands, and in the case
of oil they are kind of obsessed with assuring energy
security for the long run so they're buying up all the oil
and oil rights they can find." (Clyde Prestowitz, former
U.S. Trade Representative)
• "With China on a buying binge for raw materials to
feed its ever-expanding economy, it was inevitable that it
would eventually go beyond the more modest corporate
purchases it has already begun and make a grab for
something the United States really cares about." (New York
Times editorial, June 26, 2005)
• "There are a lot of what I call 'silk purse' deals, in
which multinational companies sold divisions which
weren't profitable, and in many cases Chinese companies
were the only logical buyers of these dog divisions. Their
owners could not make them profitable, but the Chinese
use them to help jump-start their own international
presence." Uack Lange, Paul, Weiss et al.)
• "[China's drive to acquire assets) is consistent with
government policy to secure long-term supplies. But
China is too chaotic and fragmented to think that there
is one central coordinator. China does not have a central
ministry like Japan's Ministry of Economics, Trade, and
Industry. A lot of what is happening is a bottoms-up (sic)
phenomenon with companies under pressure from their
shareholders to grow, and since they are cash-rich, to
deploy that cash efficiently." (Fred Hu, Goldman Sachs)

• "The assets involved in the Unocal transaction are
not on the scale or geographic location to make them
of critical importance to U.S. energy security. Many of
the important Unocal assets are actually located in Asi~
and the energy produced there would never flow to the
United States." (Amy Jaffe, James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy)
• " ... Unocal is not 'an American energy asset' ....
The United States does not own or control Unocal and
has no claim on the company's gas and oil reserves,
which are dotted across the globe. And Unocal does not
reserve its oil for American consumers. Like every other
oil company, it sells to the highest bidder. In the end,
its responsibility is to its shareholders, not to American
national security, as some of Unocal's recent activities
(such as working with the Taliban on a potential pipeline)
might indicate." Uames Surowiecki, The New Yorker
magazine)
• "A lot of politicians are leveraging China bashing. The
only thing [CNOOC) can do is bid higher." (Unocal
shareholder, quoted in the Wall Street Journal)
• "It's essential that we not put ... our future at risk
with a step back into protectionism." (Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Federal Reserve)
• "CNOOC's bid to take over Unocal of the United
States is a normal commercial activity between enterprises and should not fall victim to political interference." (PRC Foreign Ministry)
• "I think this is a normal business activity. The relevant
people should not make a fuss and should not interfere in
business deals for political reasons." (Liu Jianchao, PRC
Foreign Ministry)
• "The idea of buying Unocal was purely initiated by our
company. The idea did not come from the government,
and not one cent of government money is involved in the
deal. I don't think there's anyone in the government who
understands our business." (Fu Chengyu, Chairman and
CEO of CNOOC)

acted to facilitate capital accumulation and investment, and
foregone some tax revenues in exchange for a small equity
interest, but not kept a strong hand in the running of what is an
entrepreneurial business controlled by a charismatic individual.
(This of course is not to say that all PRC entities identified as
"state-owned" are innocent of state or government control
- MinMetals, the proposed acquirer of Noranda in Canada, is

in fact a direct creation [as the name indicates) of the former
Ministry of Metallurgy.)
Each of these examples should prod us to examine closely
the genesis and nature of Chinese enterprises increasingly active
on a global scale, such as CNOOC specifically. For if CNOOC
is representati\'e of anything, it is for identification of domestic
and internal firm effects arising from China's or "China lnc.'s"
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participation in the global economy and commercial legal
order. CNOOC's path is emblematic of the path future Chinese
enterprises will walk as they truly "Go Out" into the world
- first, developing their business in an increasingly marketized
domestic economy functioning under law; then, after corporatization, pursuing business activities under a host of objectively-rendered commercial, legal, financial, and corporate
governance constraints; then raising capital on developed
overseas capital markets and encountering the significant
demands of foreign securities and exchange regulation; and
finally, in the process of making offers for public and private
foreign companies, working with and being shaped by a wholly
different legal, contractual, and regulatory context, from the
negotiation of sophisticated acquisition agreements (enforce
able before courts or arbitral bodies) to the complete range of
takeover regulation and proxy rules. In addition, there will no
doubt be serious and sustained enmeshment with other regulatory systems if and when Chinese companies are successful in
gaining control of foreign industrial properties- for example,
other than ongoing corporate disclosure and securities regulation (in the post Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] United States, increasingly pertaining to internal firm governance), environmental,
occupational health and safety, labor, pension, etc. stipulations.
(Consider the experience of Lenovo as it moved its headquarters to the United States, and suddenly found its operations and
work force largely subject to a whole nest of foreign laws and
regulations.)
The CNOOC case specifically is highly instructive. CNOOC
was conceived in the late 1970s, and formally established in
the early 1980s, as a corporate representative of the sovereign,
or the People's Republic of China. (This happened even before
there was a corporate law in China, much less a law formally
governing state-owned enterprises [or "enterprises owned
by all the people"].) Having made the politically sensitive
decision to invite foreign oil companies into commercial
production sharing arrangements to explore, develop, and
hopefully produce from China's then untapped offshore oil
and gas resources, China needed to create, from whole cloth,
an entity which could sign production sharing contracts with
interested foreign concerns. CNOOC was thus established,
given franchise rights over exploration areas (and contract
blocks within those areas), and commenced accepting bids

from foreign parties for the negotiation and implementation
of such production sharing arrangements . (Distinguish the
other two large national oil companies from the PRC: China
National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC], now known as
PetroChina, was effectively the encapsulation of the "upstream,"
onshore-focused, line ministry, the Ministry of Petroleum
Industry; Sinopec, the other major Chinese oil company,
was the monopoly participant in all "downstream" activities.
A reorganization in the late 1990s saw CNPC and Sinopec
swapping some [onshore] upstream and downstream assets,
while CNOOC aggressively developed greenfield downstream
projects but gave up none of its offshore production sharing
contracts entered into with foreign concerns). Over more than
two decades of work, CNOOC concluded a large number of
production sharing deals, entered into with some of the world's
most sophisticated oil and gas companies , all focused on finding
and extracting hydrocarbons from offshore blocks. In those
two decades, many saw CNOOC as the exemplar of a new
kind of Chinese concern- admittedly a corporate front for
the state, but forced to enter into detailed production sharing
contracts (subject to binding international arbitration) modeled
closely on contractual forms used by Indonesia and Brazil, with
key input from Norway's national oil company. (CNPC, the
state-owned enterprise successor to the Ministry of Petroleum
Industry, was never forced to do this in its upstream work, and
was only permitted to enter into production sharing contracts
with foreign oilers in 1994.) While a step forward for the introduction of law and legal instruments into the basic life of one
of China's largest concerns, many of these facially sophisticated
contracts were not subject to a great deal of negotiation (except
for a narrow set of commercial terms, and the negotiable
"X factor" which divided up production based on different
volumes achieved). And yet, these contracts did provide, for the
first time in reform-era China, extremely detailed contractual
arrangements governing a joint project's exploration, development, and production phases, sophisticated tracking of expenses
and investment to effect cost and then investment recovery, and
allocation of revenue sharing (after investment and cost recoveries were fully paid out) very similar to the "waterfalls" seen in
U.S.-style partnership agreements. Moreover, these relation ships between CNOOC and foreign oilers were implemented
as commercial contracts subject to binding dispute resolution
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(as opposed to state-to-state relationships or bureaucratic
commands), and were (and are) actually contested in several
arbitrations or threatened arbitrations over the years.
CNOOC's second major brush with law, and markets
operating under some kind of rule of law, was the listing on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange of a newly-created and 70
percent-owned subsidiary- CNOOC Ltd., the summer 2005
suitor for Unocal. (The benefit of many of the better production sharing contracts originally entered into by CNOOC with
foreign co111panies was assigned to this Hong Kong-domiciled
listing vehicle.) That phenomenon left CNOOC, qua the
representative of the PRC on numerous production sharing
contracts, learning many of the same hard lessons absorbed by
other Chinese state -owned firms seeking finance in developed
capital markets. CNOOC went through a difficult period of
corporate reorganization, property (contract) rights transfers,
and abundant public disclosure, all in the service of capital
raising from mostly foreign investors (granted relatively little
governance power in exchange for their share investment). The
process even allowed CNOOC to encounter the fickle capital
markets, with CNOOC Ltd.'s first attempt at an IPO in 1999
pulled back at the last minute and then re-launched in 2001.
Some may object to any portrayal of the 2001 CNOOC
Ltd. listing in Hong Kong as progress in the terms argued here,
pointing to the unhealthy phenomenon of an entirely dominated
listing subsidiary, and a 30 percent body of passive and disempowered public shareholders positioned alongside an unconstrained and 70 percent controlling (Chinese state) shareholder.
This would be wrong, as it fails to take account of the Hong
Kong, U.S. and NYSE securities and exchange law and regulation which immediately impacted CNOOC Ltd.'s internal
governance (especially after the passage of SOX), the real
rights of minority shareholders under those external regulatory
systems, and transactional rules which call for disinterested
director or shareholder votes, exchange approvals, or the like,
prior to implementation. Again, realists might see shareholder
votes mandated at any 70 percent single shareholder-controlled
company as an empty formality. CNOOC itself disproved this
view when in 2004 another of its Hong Kong-listed subsidiaries
- China Oilfield Services Inc.- was blocked from diverting
40 percent of its US$ l 48 million revenue to another CNOOCcontrolled PRC-domiciled finance entity. Sixty-three percent

of the China Oilfield Services Inc. shareholders voted to block
the diversion of funds from one CNOOC subsidiary to another,
that shareholder vote being required by Hong Kong Stock
Exchange rules. (It is fascinating to see these same transactional rules, many of which limit the opportunism of controlling shareholders, subsequently imported directly into the
domestic Chinese legal system, via China Securities Regulatory
Commission and Shanghai Exchange regulation.)
Aspects of the Unocal bid experience itself support the idea
that CNOOC and its top management, in seeking to act outside
of China, encountered serious constraints on their behavior
that they would never have faced were CNOOC acting as a
large SOE in a purely Chinese context. CNOOC was forced to
engage directly with accepted or mandated corporate governance norms and rules designed to protect real (and minority)
shareholders. It is now known that CNOOC executives were
intent on having CNOOC Ltd. launch a bid for Unocal in
the early part of 2005, but that the transaction was frustrated
solely due to the opposition of at least one and perhaps several
independent (and all foreign national) board members at the
CNOOC Ltd. level. (While various rationales are rumored for
the objections, suffice to say that the non-executive CNOOC
board members may have harbored resentments over the
way in which the parent company and its leaders went to the
full CNOOC Ltd. board at the very last minute as a "rubber
stamp.") Observers outside China must recognize what a
profound difference this represents: When previously would any
Chinese state-run giant, even if "corporatized" (or "reformed"
into a corporation with a board of directors, executive management, shareholders, etc.) have been constrained in any way
on a proposed acquisition, especially by board-level actors?
CNOOC Chairman Fu Chengyu, by June of 2005 forced by
his non-executive directors to delay the bid for 6 long months,
and then re-enter the battle with an offer for Unocal that was
for US$2 billion higher than the bid CNOOC might originally
have made, said tellingly, if rather wistfully, "Our independent
directors believed they needed more time to further evaluate the value
ef Unocal. This showed the 900d practice ef corporate 9overnance."
Rarely in the history of China's reform has the "good practice
of corporate governance" been so keenly felt- or so costly!
Even when the board of CNOOC Ltd. was finally cajoled into
launching the bid (and not without some continued resistance

from CNOOC Ltd. board members and aspects of the PRC
central government), the Hong Kong -listed company would
have been forced to gain the approval of a sufficient number of
its public shareholders, as required under Hong Kong corporate
law and rules governing issuers listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. And finally, of course, if the bid was to be allowed to
go forward, it would have had to comply with the web of U.S.
public takeover regulation, including the Williams Act (Section
14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34Act)) and
the tender offer rules, the notifications required under Section
13(d) of the 34 Act, continuing disclosure by the bidder and its
controllin9 shareholders, and been subject to the full scope of U.S.
anti-manipulation and anti-fraud rules and jurisprudence, not to
mention the rather sobering civil liability provisions implicated.
And ultimately the bid would have required approval by
a shareholders' vote of the target, Unocal, with or without
the recommendation of the Unocal board. Again, to outside
observers, this may seem to be an insignificant process, or at
least one where Unocal shareholders could have been bribed
with an all cash Chinese offer (that "bribe" being financed,
directly and indirectly, by the PRC's treasury). Yet, that understanding does not take into account what has been business as
usual for the largest and most privileged Chinese state-owned
enterprises in the decade or so that they have grown to their
current size and ambition. Never, in the internal Chinese
domestic markets, have players of the size and influence of
a CNOOC implemented transactions (including large scale
corporate M&A or even public markets financing transactions)
other than in accordance with the explicit command and sayso of the central government (or its line-ministries), without
any real thought of what target shareholders might think, or
public rules and regulations, much less contractual constraints,
designed to inform participants' behavior and protect owners.
By seeking to acquire the shares of Unocal, CNOOC placed
itself at the relative mercy of the many shareholders of Unocal
who- regardless of the relentless public relations campaigns
being fought by both CNOOC and Chevron- had real
decision-making power in respect of CNOOC's ambitions.

We're all rule abiders now ...
CNOOC's bid for Unocal then placed "China Inc." into a brave
new world, and entangled a previously unconstrained, statecreated, oil giant in a web of laws and regulations governing
everything from internal corporate governance to external
market transactions. Whether or not people in the United

States recognize this immediately, or understand the deep
and abiding effect such constraints and proced~res will have
on the behavior of Chinese corporations as they step into the
world, the fact is certain. It is for this reason that any late-stage
denial of a successful offer for Unocal by CFIUS in the United
States (were CNOOC to have gained approval of the deal at
the Unocal shareholder level)- on anythin9 other than le9itimate
and well-considered national security arounds- would have been a
disaster for the ongoing socialization of CNOOC and "China
Inc." An unreasoned denial by a supposedly objective U.S.
agency would have signaled that the laws and governance rules
which CNOOC and other Chinese corporate actors are just
coming to terms with do not really matter and in the style
of many Chinese ministries which have in the past denied or
limited foreign investment in China on an entirely discretionary
(or plainly xenophobic) basis- raw political power, rhetorical
heat, and foreign "threat" concepts rule the day. That would be
a terrible lesson for China's emergent companies to learn at
this time in world history, or more importantly, from such a
teacher.
China is changing domestically, and specifically in the way it
is being governed by rule of law, as opposed to pure political
or bureaucratic power. Of course, much of this change is due
to organic development inside China as its economic system
comes to resemble more closely a market economy, and participants in that economy demand property and contractual rights,
and a stable legal system to protect those rights. However, these
domestic legal system changes are also clearly due to China's
increasing involvement in the global market for ownership
interests and corporate control of industrial and service properties. Without doubt, China has worked hard over more than 20
years to implement "legal construction" at home. However, it is
equally certain that the effect of China's "Going Out Strategy,"
and the resulting entanglement with external legal requirements and norms, is having a direct effect in binding China
and Chinese actors to radically different ways of acting inside
China- ways which affect everything from internal boardroom
dynamics, the status and powers of the previously ignored
minority shareholder, and the individual acting to protect his or
her rights "under law."
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Speakers program brings the world home

W

1en Assistant Professor of Law Nicholas C. Howson
addressed the International Law Workshop last fall, he
joined the lineup of one of the Law School's most popular
continuing speakers programs . The workshop, designed to
introduce "todav's most debated issues in international and
'
comparati,·e law," is presented most weeks during the fall and
winter semesters and features experts speaking on a variety of
cutting edge topics. Although the programs feature speakers

who are experts in their fields, the lectures ar~ designed for
non-specialists and attract listeners from a variety of disciplines.
The question-answer session that follows each lecture adds to
the richness of the exchange.
Howson's talk (a version is reproduced on the preceeding
pages), was one of 15 International Law Workshop lectures
presented this academic year.
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